The environment is sampled by multiple senses, which are woven together to produce a 24 unified perceptual state. However, optimally unifying such signals requires assigning particular 25 signals to the same or different underlying objects or events. Many prior studies (especially in 26 animals) have assumed fusion of cross-modal information, whereas recent work in humans has 27 begun to probe the appropriateness of this assumption. Here we present results from a novel 28 behavioral task in which both monkeys and humans localized visual and auditory stimuli and 29 reported their perceived sources through saccadic eye movements. When the locations of visual 30 and auditory stimuli were widely separated, subjects made two saccades, while when the two 31 stimuli were presented at the same location they made only a single saccade. Intermediate levels 32 of separation produced mixed response patterns: a single saccade to an intermediate position on 33 some trials or separate saccades to both locations on others. The distribution of responses was 34 well described by a hierarchical causal inference model that accurately predicted both the 35 explicit "same vs. different" source judgements as well as biases in localization of the source(s) 36 under each of these conditions. The results from this task are broadly consistent with prior work 37 in humans across a wide variety of analogous tasks, extending the study of multisensory causal 38 inference to non-human primates and to a natural behavioral task with both a categorical assay of 39 the number of perceived sources and a continuous report of the perceived position of the stimuli. 40 41
make a probabilistic choice between the two (the latter indicating that the subject has learned that 179 a mix of behaviors is required). The PF model is equivalent to forced fusion or forced 180 segregation models commonly compared with causal inference models [2, 3, 23] , but is more integration [20, 24] . When the sources are assumed to be independent, the resulting estimates are 189 independent and rely only on the sensory information and the prior (̂,̂, Fig 2B, blue and red).
190
Because the trials were interleaved with varying amounts of target separation, subjects could not 191 know ahead of time which response pattern was ideal. This forced them to adopt some kind of 192 behavioral strategy to arbitrate between these two response patterns ( Fig 2B, 194 In order to characterize the localization component of the task under different behavioral 195 strategies, we considered three possible models, two that incorporate causal inference and one 196 that does not. The first causal inference model was a Bayes optimal strategy, in which the 197 observer combined the potential localization estimates (i.e. fused or separate) according to the 198 posterior probability of causal structure, Pr( = 1| , ), which we refer to as model averaging 199 (MA) [2] . The second causal inference model, which we refer to as model selection (MS), 200 implemented a heuristic decision rule [4] . Instead of weighting the fused and separate estimates according to posterior probability, the model implemented a threshold decision and simply 202 selected whichever causal structure was most likely (i.e. selecting the fusion strategy when 203 Pr( = 1| , ) > 0.5, and otherwise using the segregated strategy). For comparison with these 204 two causal inference variants, we again compared with a default probabilistic fusion (PF) model, 205 which does not incorporate information from the causal judgement. Instead, the subject is 206 assumed to choose between fused and segregated response distributions randomly at some fixed 207 rate, defined by . This includes the possibility for either always-fuse or always-segregate 208 response patterns. Importantly, all of these models implement the same rule for choosing to make 209 either one or two saccades on a given trial (the Bay model for unity judgement). This means that 210 each model was compared only based on how well it captured the distribution of location reports, 211 rather than the ratio of single to dual saccade reports.
212
We fit the models using a maximum-likelihood strategy, estimating the parameters that 213 provided the best fit the behavioral data (number of saccades or location of saccades, for unity 214 judgement and localization models respectively) for each condition. In addition to fitting to each 215 of these separate task components independently, we also fit models jointly to both components 216 of the task (i.e. maximizing likelihood for both the number of saccades and the location of 
Unity Judgement
In order to determine whether subjects were performing causal inference in our task, we 224 first analyzed the explicit portion of the response: whether the subject made one or two saccades. 225 We found that subjects were much more likely to make one saccade when the targets were 226 coincident or close together and much more likely to make two saccades when the targets were 227 well separated (Fig 3) . This means that the observers were not performing pure fusion (always 228 integrating stimuli), nor pure segregation (always treating the stimuli as independent), but instead 229 adopting a strategy that depended on target separation. Importantly, humans and monkeys 230 showed qualitatively similar performance on this component of the task (Fig 3, left We compared the two different CI strategies for localization (MA and MS) as well as the 289 non-CI probabilistic PF strategy (Fig 5, center) . Both species were much better fit by one of the 290 CI models, though the preferred strategy differed between species. The model-averaging 291 observer provided the best fit for human subjects (Pexc = 0.73), while providing worse fits for 292 monkeys (Pexc = 0.14). Conversely, monkeys were better fit by a model selection strategy (Pexc = 293 0.71) than humans (Pexc = 0.18). For both species, the probabilistic fusion model provided 294 significantly worse fits (Human subjects: Pexc = 0.09; monkey subjects: Pexc = 0.15) than the 295 combination of CI strategies. Collapsing across CI models, some form of CI was ~10 times more 296 likely than the PF model for humans, while for monkeys CI was ~6 times more likely. These 297 results indicate that subjects from both species are incorporating causal inference into the 298 localization component of the task, rather than only the unity judgement component.
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When this same set of models were fit jointly to both the localization and unity 300 judgement data, the species level difference between model fits disappeared and it was no longer 301 possible to differentiate the two CI strategies (Fig 5, right) . Both of the CI strategies provided a 302 better fit than the PF strategy. The PF strategy was ~7 times and ~3 times less likely than the 303 combination of MA and MS models for humans and monkeys respectively (Human subjects: Pexc 304 = 0.13; monkey subjects: Pexc = 0.24). This again provides evidence that both species were 305 performing causal inference in this task, both for the localization and unity judgement We have presented a novel behavioral paradigm for multisensory localization that 310 provides rich perceptual readouts for both human and monkey subjects. We demonstrated that
